

THE NARRATIVE OF HERODOTUS VII AND THE DECREE OF THEMISTOCLES AT TROEZEN

In this paper an attempt is made to establish the chronology which Herodotus intended to convey for events in Book vii on the basis of his arrangement of topics for a listening audience. The relationship of the Decree to those events is then discussed. The question of the authenticity of the Decree's contents is considered with special reference to the arrangements for manning the fleet. Thus the paper falls into three parts.¹ An Appendix on the later tradition is added.

I. NARRATION AND CHRONOLOGY IN HERODOTUS VII 117–19

Even if we lacked the testimonies which we do have that Herodotus recited his work at Athens and at Olympia,² we should assume him to have done so. For he lived before the development of multiple copies or 'books' of a written text, and he had no alternative but to be a reciter of tales even as Homer was a singer of songs. This affected his method of composition: like a lecturer today, he had to mark the guidelines of each topic and emphasise the beginning and the end, since his listener was usually hearing the reading once and for all.

In the bulk of Book vii Herodotus employed two methods in arranging his material. The first method, used also by Thucydides in his *Archaeologia*,³ may be called the Chinese box system in which one topic fits inside another and they are then unfitted in reverse order.⁴ Thus from the third sentence of vii 131 to vii 133.1 the topics are as follows: A the Persian heralds, B the Greek states, C the Greeks' oath described and concluded with the words τὸ μὲν δὴ ὄρκιον ὧδε εἶχε τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, B the Greek states, not visited by A the heralds, with the final sentence τούτων μὲν εἵνεκα οὐκ ἔπεμψε Ξέρξης τοὺς αἰτήσοντας (κήρυκας). In one case, it may be noted, the conclusion of the topic is marked by a μὲν δὴ clause, and in the other by a μὲν clause. I underline these uses of μὲν δὴ and μὲν for emphasis, here and below.

The second method is the more common one in Book vii. The topics follow one another like beads on a string, each topic being clearly marked off from the next one. Often the subject of the topic is stated at the start and re-stated at the end (as with the oath of the Greeks at vii 132.2 τὸ δὲ ὄρκιον ὧδε εἶχε, and τὸ μὲν δὴ ὄρκιον ὧδε εἶχε τοῖσι Ἕλλησι). In this method too the end of a topic is usually marked by μὲν δὴ or μὲν in its final clause. Thus at 117 the death of Artachaeus is introduced, described and re-stated with the phrase βασιλεὺς μὲν δὴ Ξέρξης ἀπολομένου Ἀρταχαιέω ἐποιέετο συμφορῆν. At 118 the pressure on the Greek hosts of entertaining Xerxes is introduced, described and re-stated with the phrase οἱ μὲν δὴ πιεζόμενοι ὁμῶς τὸ ἐπιτασσόμενον ἐπετέλεον at 121.1. Next, at 121, the naval force to await Xerxes at Therma is introduced, described at length (with 'the naval force' repeated for the listener's ear at

¹ Professor H. D. Westlake kindly read a first draft of the first part; Mr D. M. Lewis a version of the second part; and Professor W. K. Lacey the whole paper. I am most grateful for their helpful comments.

² For public recitations at Athens see Diyllus F 3 (*FGrH* 73) and at Olympia Lucian, *Herod.* 1. The value of such recitation in influencing opinion in the Greek world is apt to be overlooked by those who forget that all our methods of issuing information and propaganda were then lacking.

³ I drew attention to this method of arrangement, and also to the importance of hiatus and the juxtaposition of rough consonants for a listener, in my articles 'The Composition of Thucydides' History', *CQ* xxxiv (1940) 146 ff. and ii (1952) 127 ff.

⁴ In the specific analysis which follows I have avoided such technical terms as ring composition (anaphoric or other), circular composition, and refrain composition, which carry one into abstract theories. The clearest account of these terms is that of H. R. Immerwahr, *Form and Thought in Herodotus* (Ohio 1966), who uses the term 'framing sentences' for my second method of arrangement, as at his p. 58 'the well-known sentences . . . the first part of this sentence (vii 179) closes the story of the oracle . . . in its second part the sentence initiates the account of the movement of Xerxes' fleet'. I have also avoided calling a topic a *logos*, which has for me the connotation of a theme, e.g. Immerwahr's 'Greek Preparations Logos' (vii 131–78).

122, 123.1 and 123.3) and re-stated with the phrase *ὁ μὲν δὴ ναυτικὸς στρατὸς αὐτοῦ . . . περιμένων βασιλέα ἐστρατοπεδεύετο* at 124. With the second sentence of 124 the army's march to Therma via the Echedorus river is introduced, described and concluded with the encamping of the army and a reference to the Echedorus river (*ἐστρατοπεδεύοντο μὲν δὴ . . . Ἐχειδῶρος . . . ἐπέλιπε* 127.2).

While this second method keeps each topic clear to the listener, it leaves the chronological relationship between the topics vague; for the topics follow one another as topics and not as consecutive steps in a chronological sequence. Thus the death of Artachaees at Acanthus comes as a topic before the pressure on the Greek hosts; but chronologically Herodotus turns back from Xerxes' arrival at Acanthus to the pressure of hospitality at Thasos and at Abdera. So too the navy's voyage to Therma is not intended to antedate the army's setting out from the Strymon valley. In fact the relationship of the *μὲν δὴ* clause to the following *δέ* clause is one of contrast between one topic and another topic. It has no direct connotation of time, let alone of contemporaneous time. Rather, each clause is like a signpost at a road-junction; one points backwards to the topic which has just been treated, and the other points forward to the topic which will be treated. We shall see how important this distinction is when we reach the end of the next topic.

The next topic, at 128, has two prongs: Xerxes' desire to view the mouth of the Peneus ('Peneus' is repeated at 128.2, 129.2, 3, 4, and 130.1), and his intention to send his army into Perrhaebia (*ἐς Περραιβούς* 128.1). Herodotus dealt with the first prong at length and ended with the words *θησαύμενος ἀπέπλεε ἐς τὴν Θέρμην* (130.3 fin.). He then resumed and dealt rapidly with the second prong in two sentences at 131 beginning with *ὁ μὲν δὴ περὶ Πιερίην*. Next in his clause he turned to his new topic, the envoys sent to Greece. I cite the relevant passage because it has been a source of error.

εἶπας δὲ ταῦτα καὶ θησαύμενος ἀπέπλεε ἐς τὴν Θέρμην. ὁ μὲν δὴ περὶ Πιερίην διέτριβε ἡμέρας συχνάς· τὸ γὰρ δὴ ὄρος τὸ Μακεδονικὸν ἔκειρε τῆς στρατῆς τριτημορίας, ἵνα ταύτῃ διεξίη ἅπασα ἡ στρατιή ἐς Περραιβούς· οἱ δὲ δὴ κήρυκες οἱ ἀποπεμφθέντες ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐπὶ γῆς αἴτησιν ἀπίκατο οἱ μὲν κεινοί, οἱ δὲ φέροντες γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ, 130 fin.—131.

With these words having viewed (the Peneus-mouth) he was sailing back towards Therma. Indeed he was spending many days in Pieria, since a third part of his army was clearing the Macedonian mountain so that the whole army might pass through on that route into Perrhaebia. But the heralds sent off to Greece to demand earth had come back some empty-handed and others bringing earth and water.⁵

Herodotus' mind and our ears are on the topics: (1) the sight of the Peneus, (2) the crossing to Perrhaebia, (3) the heralds sent to Greece. Chronologically speaking, there is confusion. Xerxes was off to Therma, probably in August 480, in topic (1); he was staying in Pieria (just north of the Peneus) in topic (2); and topic (3) takes us back in time to the despatch of the envoys in

⁵ The Peneus-mouth was in Thessaly between the Thessalian mountains Olympus and Ossa (vii 128.1), and the protection of Thessaly was to be attempted at 'the Olympic pass', i.e. at the frontier by Heracleum in Pieria (vii 172.2). See N. G. L. Hammond, *A History of Macedonia* i (Oxford 1972) 139 for the geography. The three imperfect tenses are to be noted; for they show that Xerxes' stay in Pieria, while one third of the army was there, occurred during his voyage back to Therma. In an analogous case at vi 116 fin.—118.3 the dream of Datis at Myconos was placed within his voyage back to Asia; this was expressed by three imperfect tenses (*ἀπέπλεον, ἔπλεε, ἀπέπλεε*). Note too the pluperfect

ἀπίκατο at 118.2, which has the same meaning and time-stress as the verb here. C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963) 109 'if Xerxes was in Pieria, he could not be in Therma', simply failed to understand Herodotus. Immerwahr (n. 4) 133, translating '(Xerxes had) spent a good many days in Pieria', seems to have assumed a pluperfect tense. In putting the stay of Xerxes not during the return to Therma but during the advance from Therma to Malis, Immerwahr had to make the army march at an excessive speed, some 25 to 30 miles a day (134 n. 163). The meaning 'coming back' in *ἀπίκατο* is implied by the context, as in vi 118.2 (LSJ⁹ s.v.).

autumn of the preceding year (at vii 32). Now this last leap back in time is not irrational.⁶ What Herodotus has been describing in vii 1 to the first sentence of vii 131 is Persian affairs from the news of defeat at Marathon reaching Darius late in 490 to the arrival of Xerxes in Pieria in August 480. Xerxes was then in the last province of his empire (*cf.* vi 44.1, vii 108.1), and he was on the border of Greece, the first free area. Herodotus turns now, in the third sentence of vii 131, to Greek affairs, which he had carried only as far as the death of Miltiades in 489 (at vi 136.3). In dealing with Greek affairs he proceeds again topic by topic, and the topic which he takes first is the mission of the heralds sent to Greece by Xerxes, namely that on their return some were empty-handed, and others brought earth and water.⁷

On one side of the transition Herodotus used three imperfect tenses (*ἀπέπλεε, διέτριβε, ἔκειρε*) and on the other side a pluperfect (*ἀπικάτο*), thereby indicating that the heralds *had* come back *before* Xerxes was staying in Pieria. He did not tell us when the heralds came back and where they reported to Xerxes. But he did say that they left Sardis as soon as Xerxes reached Sardis, say on October 1st, 481 (vii 32). Now the journey from Sardis to Thebes of about one thousand km may have taken six weeks, so that they were active in northern Greece during the first half of November 481 and returned in early January 480 to report to Xerxes at Sardis, where he was still in winter quarters (37.1).⁸ Meanwhile news of their activities and of those who had submitted reached Athens and Sparta. It led at once to the oath being sworn against all who had submitted, 'those who being Greek gave themselves up to the Persians not under compulsion' (*οἱ τῶ Πέρσῃ ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτοὺς Ἕλληνες ἐόντες, μὴ ἀναγκασθέντες*⁹ 132.2). The oath, then, was taken in late November or early December 481. As it was taken by 'the Greeks, those who had declared war on the barbarian' (*οἱ Ἕλληνες ἔταμον ὄρκιον οἱ τῶ βαρβάρῳ πόλεμον ἀειράμενοι*), the Greek League was already in existence by November/December 481.

The passage which we have cited in full, 130 fin.—131, has been widely misinterpreted. The sentences, especially the *μὲν δὴ* clause and the *δέ* clause, have been read in isolation and without understanding of Herodotus' system of arranging his topics; and in consequence the impression has been gained that Herodotus intended to make Xerxes' stay in Pieria contemporary with the return of the heralds to Xerxes. Indeed, G. Rawlinson¹⁰ went so far as to add some words (which I underline) in his translation so that this impression was made into a statement: 'The stay of Xerxes in Pieria lasted for several days. . . . *At this time* the heralds who had been sent . . . returned *to the camp*.' He failed to observe two points: the idiomatic Herodotean use of *μὲν δὴ* followed by *δέ* and the significance of the pluperfect tense.

Historians appear to have accepted Rawlinson's interpretation without question. Thus C. Hignett, for example, wrote as follows. 'Herodotus declares that tokens of submission . . . were brought by Persian envoys to Xerxes at Therma, just before the invasion began, perhaps as late as August 480.' 'According to Herodotus' own account these people', wrote P. A. Brunt, meaning the medisers, 'did not proffer submission to Xerxes till he had reached the neighbourhood of Pieria (vii 131.1–2), i.e. not till June 480.' Again, while Xerxes was at Therma, 'he was awaiting

⁶ We may compare vi 119–20, where Datis' voyage to Asia and the settlement of Eretrian deportees are described before the arrival of the Spartans at Athens en route for Marathon. Here, at 120.1, we have the usual links *μὲν δὴ* and *δέ*.

⁷ Immerwahr 130 ff. puts the end of his *logos* 'The march of Xerxes to the Confines of Greece (vii 26.1–130)' at the end of 130 and the start of his next *logos* 'Greek Preparations Logos (vii 131–78)' at the beginning of 131. This cuts the concluding sentence *διεξίτη ἅπαντα ἢ στρατὴν ἐς Περραιβούς* away from its antecedents in 128 (*ἔλθῶν . . . ἐς Περραιβούς*). In fact the new topic—his *logos*—begins with the *δέ* clause, *οἱ δὲ δὴ κήρυκες* and the pluperfect tense *ἀπικάτο*.

⁸ Recorded lists of Theorodokoi show that they

travelled between 35 and 40 km a day on a sacred mission. The King's heralds, travelling on a made-up road as far as Macedonia, should have made equally good speed.

⁹ The lack of a connecting particle at the start of 132.2 suggests an immediate sequence. In the next sentence the aorist *ἔδοσαν* looks back to the aorist participle *δόντων*, emphasising that they did submit, whereas in English we should say 'had submitted'. The sentence is not phrased to include any who might submit in the future.

¹⁰ Everyman trans., 1858; and likewise G. B. Grundy, *The Great Persian War* (London 1901) 226, 228.

the return and reports', wrote A. R. Burn, 'of his heralds sent long before from Sardis with the summons to surrender'. The supposed absence of the heralds for ten months made Hignett regard Herodotus' account as 'unlikely'.¹¹ Brunt, seeing that their absence (for him) of eight months would not be acceptable, blamed Herodotus and censured him for 'reporting inaccurately'.¹² Burn tried to justify his interpretation of Herodotus. He converted the heralds into 'Persian agents' and had them 'living unobtrusively' in the mountains of Greece for many months. Yet they had only to cross an open frontier—without even invoking their diplomatic immunity—in order to make or send a report to their master, who had a summary method of punishing malingerers.¹³ None of these interpreters realised that as in earlier chapters of this book Herodotus was not giving a temporal meaning to the sentences marked by *μὲν δὴ* and *δέ* at 131.

The effects of their misinterpretation were considerable. They had to suppose that the medisation of the states 'not under compulsion' as listed by Herodotus at 132.1 and the oath against them at 132.2 were dated by Herodotus to shortly before and shortly after August 480; i.e. that the medisation happened between the expedition to Tempe and that to Thermopylae, and the oath was taken shortly after the retreat from Thermopylae. Hignett tried to overcome so late a dating of the oath by assuming that Herodotus was mistaken in writing of one oath; it should have been two, one sworn in general terms at the foundation of the Greek League and another sworn after the retreat from Thermopylae, to which time Hignett shifts the medisation 'not under compulsion'.¹⁴ Anyone who reads Herodotus vii 132 will see that the oath was taken against those who *did* give themselves up to the Persians,¹⁵ indeed those named, those from whom the heralds brought earth and water; and they did so 'not under compulsion'.¹⁶ Hignett's double oath sinks even in the waters of speculation. Burn placed the medisation of the states 'not under compulsion' after the retreat from Tempe (first mentioned at 173)¹⁷ and the oath apparently just after it, citing Herodotus 132.2 as if Herodotus supported this interpretation or as if those against whom the oath was taken at 132 were general and not specific (although listed). Burn did not, in this connection, mention that of those listed by Herodotus as having medised at 132.1 the Locrians and the Thebans served on the Greek side in the Thermopylae campaign; and that when the Thessalians asked for help to be sent to Tempe they had *already* 'medised the first time, under compulsion as they claimed, because the machinations of the Aleuadae did not please them' (vii 172.1; cf. vii 130.3; and for the machinations see vii 6.2).¹⁸

Let us return to the comparatively clear waters of Herodotus' new topic.

The heralds sent to Hellas (this began south of Macedonia) to demand earth had returned some empty-handed, others bringing earth and water. Those who gave these (tokens) included the following: Thessalians, Dolopes, Enienes, Perrhaebians, Locrians, Magnetes, Malians, Phthiotid Achaeans and Thebans and the other Boeotians except for the Thespians and the Plataeans. Against them the Greeks swore an oath, the Greeks that is who declared war on the barbarian. The oath was as follows: when their own affairs turned out well,¹⁹ to dedicate to the God of Delphi one tenth of all

¹¹ Hignett (n. 5) 109, 18.

¹² 'The Hellenic League against Persia', *Historia* ii (1953) 136. Xerxes sent his heralds well before delivering his attack, as Darius had done in 491 (vi 48).

¹³ *Persia and the Greeks* (London 1962) 339.

¹⁴ Yet if compulsion means anything, it should refer not to the time before Xerxes invaded but to the time when Xerxes' army was already pouring into central Greece after the retreat of the Greeks from Thermopylae.

¹⁵ The sequence of Herodotus' words in vii 132 τῶν δὲ δόντων and ὅσοι τῷ Πέρσῃ ἔδοσαν σφέας αὐτούς is entirely clear; there is no need for the obfuscation of their meaning in How and Wells, *Comm.* ii 177.

¹⁶ That is, before Xerxes' army was even in the country.

¹⁷ In fact after the retreat from Tempe there was 'compulsion' for those exposed to attack.

¹⁸ H. D. Westlake, 'The Medism of Thessaly', *JHS* lvi (1936) 16, dated the intrigue with Persia to 492. The Aleuadae were then 'rulers of Thessaly' (vii 6.2 οἱ δὲ Ἀλευάδαι οὗτοι ἦσαν Θεσσαλῆς βασιλείες) and as such imposed their medising policy on the people; that at least was the 'compulsion' which the people claimed at 172.1. I do not go along with N. Robertson, 'The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.', *JHS* xcvi (1976) 106, who translates 'Thessalian Kings' (or 'Kings in Thessaly').

¹⁹ The σφι refers to the subject of δεκατεῦσαι, namely the loyalist Greeks, and not to the subject of ἔδοσαν, which would make no sense. Herodotus gave emphasis by delaying τούτους to its present position in

those who had given themselves up to the Persian not under compulsion. Such was the oath for the Greeks.

As I understand it, the heralds reached the states of Greece north of Attica in the first part of November 481; received the submission there and then of the listed peoples; and returned to Sardis to report. The members of the Greek League meanwhile took their action only in the form of the oath;²⁰ for it would have been absurd to start fighting against other Greeks now, in November/December 481.

The mission of the heralds and its effects having been concluded with the words *τὸ μὲν δὴ ὄρκιον ὧδε εἶχε τοῖσι Ἑλλησι*, Herodotus embarked with the *δέ* clause on the non-sending of the heralds to Athens and Sparta (133.1, referring back to vii 32 *ἀπέπεμπε κήρυκας ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα αἰτήσοντας γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ*), and after diversions in chronology back to 492 and forward to 429 he finished it rather abruptly with the *μὲν νυν* clause at 137.3 fin. His next topic, at 138.1, that the expedition of Xerxes was launched nominally against Athens (vii 8.1 init. and 8 β 1) but actually against all of Greece (vii 5.1 and 6.1), was something which the Greek states realised 'long in advance' (*πρὸ πολλοῦ*) and treated in different ways, some submitting (i.e. those named at 132.1) and others not submitting. The latter were in a state of great fear, because there was not in Greece a war-fleet large enough to face the coming invader, nor did the majority intend to go to war but were medizing eagerly' ('eagerly' i.e. 'not under compulsion', referring to 132.1–2). The time factors are clear. The news of the impending invasion (see below, especially on vii 239) came 'long in advance' of the actual responses of the Greeks. Those who did not submit were without the war-fleet; this they put together only after Athens had manned two hundred ships and the other loyalist states had agreed to send their flotillas, say late in 481; and those who did submit were doing so eagerly, in November 481. Herodotus is writing still of 481, not of the medisations of summer 480.

This topic leads him to the encomium of Athens (139).²¹ Then he proceeds neatly to the terrible responses of the Oracle at Delphi (139.6–144.3), and he concludes that topic with the sentence *τὰ μὲν δὴ χρηστήρια ταῦτα τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ἐγεγόνεε* (145.1). Here the pluperfect tense is used to indicate that these responses had been made *before* the next topic, the coming together of the loyalist Greeks and their debate on matters of policy (145.1). They decided to end any wars among themselves. Afterwards (145.2) the arrival of Xerxes at Sardis was reported to them, presumably in the course of early November when his heralds were entering Thessaly. The original meeting of the Greeks, then, was in October 481. The oath to exact retribution from the medising tribes was sworn in late November or early December 481.

The first consultant of the Oracle of Delphi was Sparta 'at the very beginning of the war' (*περὶ τοῦ πολέμου τούτου αὐτίκα κατ' ἀρχὰς ἐγειρομένου* 220.3 and 239.1); for Sparta was the first to hear of Xerxes mounting an expedition against Greece (239.1). The same expression of time was used of Argos consulting the Oracle (148.2, *αὐτίκα κατ' ἀρχὰς τὰ ἐκ τοῦ βαρβάρου ἐγειρόμενα ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα*). If the news was sent from Susa in spring 481, as Herodotus indicates (239.1), it took probably some four months en route²² and reached Sparta perhaps in

his sentence. Note the hiatus in *σφι εὔ*, which is for emphasis. Compare the use of the phrase at vi 105.3.

²⁰ Immerwahr (n. 4) 134 n. 164 with references; 'in modern times, the oath has been variously dated. . . . However, nothing in Herodotus' narrative prevents making the oath contemporary with the return of the heralds. . . .' This is correct; but it is an understatement in that, as appears from the lack of connective at 132.2, Herodotus thought of the oath following closely on the medisations.

²¹ This passage, written probably towards the end of the First Peloponnesian War and not, as How and Wells suggest, in the opening years of the Second Peloponnesian War, is an excellent example of what brought

Herodotus a gift of ten talents from the Athenian state in 446/5 (see n. 2). Some have thought the sum 'extravagant' (so How and Wells, i 7 n. 1); but Pindar was paid over one and a half talents by Athens for a mere dithyramb in which he called Athens 'the bulwark of Greece'. The influence of Herodotus' history at the time and even on posterity's view of Athens was cheap at the price. The Anytus who proposed the decree to pay Herodotus was probably the grandfather of the Anytus who prosecuted Socrates in 399. Herodotus presumably earned a living and paid for his travels by reciting for a remuneration.

²² Herodotus allowed three months for a traveller from Susa to Sardis (v 50.2, 54).

August 481. Herodotus merely remarks that the consultation of the Oracle was well before the envoys of 'The Greeks' reached Argos (148.3). On receiving the news in August Sparta informed the other Greek states (239.4), and in particular (we may assume) Athens as the other target of the Persian expedition. Athens, then, consulted the Oracle of Delphi in late August or early September 481.²³ This fits the pluperfect tense of 145.1.

The responses of the Oracle to Athens were so alarming that they were debated at once by the Athenian Assembly (140–142.1 ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆμον); for it was uncertain what the Oracle meant by the phrases 'the wooden wall' and 'holy Salamis' (142.2–3). During the debate,²⁴ still in early September 481, Themistocles persuaded the Assembly to adopt his interpretation of the phrases. 'So in the debate following the oracular response they decided to receive with their full forces on their warships the impending invasion of Greece by the barbarian—in obedience to the god—together with any Greeks who were willing' (144.3, ἅμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι).²⁵ They already had two hundred ships, laid down in accordance with an earlier proposal by Themistocles for the war against Aegina (144.1–2); now they decided to build yet more ships (144.2 fin.).²⁶ All this happened, in September 481, before the loyalist Greeks met and formed the Greek League.²⁷ It was shortly after their meeting that the war between Athens and Aegina and other wars were brought to an end by the Greek League (145.1, 146.1), probably in late October or early November 481.

The wars ended, three spies were sent to Asia (146.1). They found Xerxes at Sardis, perhaps in December/January. He captured them early enough to send them back to Greece so that they were there before he began his march out of Sardis in spring 480 (147.1). Such were the chronological limits of the spies-incident, closed with the familiar μέν νυν clause (148.1). In the corresponding δέ clause (148.1) Herodotus shifts back to the time of the original despatch of the spies as he relates the sending off to Argos of the envoys of 'The Greeks who had taken the oath against the Persians'. Now the Argives had already consulted the Oracle of Delphi in summer

²³ Compare Immerwahr (n. 4) 135, n. 168. 'Herodotus clearly puts the oracles, and with them the whole section from vii 138 (second sentence) to vii 145.1 (a section which he says deals with events that happened πρὸ πολλοῦ of Xerxes' invasion), in 481 B.C., while Xerxes was still in Susa'. Rather, perhaps, in the time before Xerxes reached Sardis. How and Wells ii 181 recognise that Herodotus put Athens' consultation of Delphi before the first gathering of loyalist Greeks was summoned to form the Greek League, which began to operate 'in the autumn of 481'. C. W. Fornara, 'The value of the Themistocles Decree', *AmHistR* lxxiii (1967–8) 427, 'these oracles Herodotus dates unambiguously to the time before the Battles of Artemisium and Thermopylae', implies a proximity to the battles which is far from the case in Herodotus; but Fornara was arguing against those who would date the oracles even later, to the eve of the Battle of Salamis.

²⁴ Those who informed Herodotus of this crucial debate and many of his listeners when he recited at Athens had been in the Assembly at the time and knew the famous responses. To suppose that the debate was in fact about totally different oracles which mentioned neither the wooden wall nor Salamis is surely to suppose that Herodotus' informants and his listeners were dupes or idiots; and the view of a past generation of scholars, e.g. as stated by Macan, or Grundy 'the second oracle was obviously obtained with especial reference to the battle of Salamis', is unrealistic. It required little ingenuity for the priests at Delphi in September 481 to foretell Persia's capture of Attica and a killing of persons on Salamis, the nearest haven for troops and refugees, and to wrap it up in ambiguous words. Similarly the

priests could foretell for the Spartans the sack of a great town or, failing that, the death of a Heraclid king; for Persia would not stop at less (vii 220.4).

²⁵ This phrase shows that 'The Greeks' had not yet come into being; for once the Greek League was formed, Herodotus called its members 'The Greeks' (e.g. 132.2 twice; 145.1; 149.1; 150.3; 157.1; 158.5; 163.1 twice; 163.2; 165 twice; 166; 168 five times).

²⁶ The Greek of Herodotus is crystal clear; his 200 ships ready and more to be built cannot be changed into one hundred now and another hundred later even by ingenious arguments (see R. J. Lenardon, *The Saga of Themistocles* [London 1978] 54).

²⁷ Immerwahr *loc cit.* (n. 23) 'It seems that this paragraph vii 144.3 must also be dated to 481 B.C.', indeed Herodotus' participle βουλευομένοισι here ties the decision back to the assembly to which the report of the response was made (142.1 ἀπήγγελλον ἐς τὸν δῆμον). How and Wells ii 181 and many since them (see Hignett [n. 5] 441) try to date the response of the Oracle later but without justification. Once the Greek League was formed, the Oracle wisely changed its tune. Burn (n. 13) 355 f. chose to move the consultation by Athens down to just before the occupation of Thermopylae by the Greeks in summer 480 and with it the decision at 144.3 of 'these courageous, anxious men of 480' as he writes (359), 'after the collapse of northern Greece' (361). It has the dramatic quality of the last-minute decision; but it rests on no evidence at all. Hignett 464 sees that the decision by 'the Ekklesia' has to be early and talks of it marking the first of 'two stages'. He disregards Herodotus' dating of it.

481; but despite the Oracle's answer they preferred now to negotiate but with an abortive result. The topic ended at 153.1. The next topic (153.1) was the envoys sent to Sicily (153–167) who visited Corcyra en route (168); and then others to Crete (169–171). No indication is given of the times at which these various envoys returned.

The topic of the envoys to Crete ends with the usual *μὲν δὴ* clause at 171.2. The new topic, introduced in the corresponding *δέ* clause, is the request of the Thessalians for help on learning that the Persian was about to cross into Europe, i.e. about April 480. Although Herodotus failed to say so, it is apparent that the threat of reprisals by 'The Greeks' had caused the medising states and tribes to recant. The expedition to Tempe was short, lasting only while Xerxes was at Abydus (174.1), around May 480. On their return to the Isthmus 'The Greeks' decided to make their stand at Thermopylae and Artemisium (175.1–177.1 *οἱ μὲν οὖν χῶροι οὗτοι*). The troops and the ships did not move to these stations until news reached them at the Isthmus that the Persians were in Pieria, probably in August (177 with the corresponding *δέ*; compare 178.1 *οἱ μὲν δὴ* and *Δελφοὶ δέ*, and the same idiom at 178 fin. and 179 init.).

The probable dating of events which we have considered is then as follows:²⁸

481	April	Xerxes about to set off from Susa. Demaratus sends off his messenger from Susa.
	July/Aug.	Demaratus' message reaches Sparta.
	August	Sparta consults Delphi. Argos consults Delphi.
	Aug./Sept.	Athens consults Delphi.
	September	Athens decides to concentrate all forces on the fleet and lays the keels of more ships.
	Sept./Oct.	Xerxes' army reaches Sardis. Heralds sent at once to Greece.
	October	The Greeks form their organisation at Sparta.
	Oct./Nov.	Negotiations to end interstate wars. Spies sent to Asia, and envoys to Argos and other states.
	November, first half	Xerxes' heralds obtain many submissions, from Thessaly to Boeotia.
	Nov./Dec.	The Greeks threaten eventual reprisals, and the medising states recant. ²⁹
	Dec./Jan.	Spies reach Asia and are caught.
480	February	Spies are sent back to Greece.
	April	Xerxes leaves Sardis.
	May	Xerxes at Abydus. Greeks move to Tempe and back to the Isthmus.
	June	The Greeks decide to make a stand at Thermopylae and Artemisium.
	August	Xerxes in Pieria. Greeks move up to Thermopylae and Artemisium.
	September	Fall of Thermopylae. ³⁰

We should add the point, made by Herodotus in viii 3, that a claim to command the naval forces of the Greek League was advanced by the Athenians before the envoys were sent off to Sicily, i.e. before November 481. The Athenian claim, we may be sure, was based not on the number of hulls in her shipyards but on her decision, taken in September 481, and presumably implemented then, to put all her forces on her fleet and build even more ships. The manning of two hundred ships put her far ahead of the fleets of such states as Corinth (which manned forty ships for Artemisium; and again for Salamis, when she also sent troops to defend the Isthmus). What mattered in 481 was Athens' commitment to total resistance at sea, manifested by her having already manned a huge fleet.³¹

²⁸ The chronology proposed by K. J. Sacks, 'Herodotus and the dating of Thermopylae', *CQ* xxvi (1976) 232 ff., is adopted here as correct.

²⁹ E.g. the Thessalians; see n. 17.

³⁰ Sacks (n. 28) dated this to September 19th.

³¹ Until then the Athenian fleet had ranked below those of Aegina, Corinth, Corcyra and some East Greek islands; it was the army's victory at Marathon which had been her claim to strength.

Plutarch (*Them.* 7.1) placed between the ostracism of Aristides (in 483/2) and the expedition to Tempe (in May 480) an attempt by Themistocles to embark the citizens on the fleet and to evacuate the city; and Plutarch then had Themistocles try 'again' after the retreat from Artemisium and be successful. His interest was in the evacuation; and it was of course the flight from Attica in late September 480 which was sensational. Herodotus described that flight at viii 40 and 41.1 as due not to a decision by the Assembly (that had been taken at vii 144.3) but to 'a proclamation'. This was no doubt correct, as almost all the citizens were on board ship in late September 480.

We owe to Herodotus our knowledge that Xanthippus was a general in the Attic year 480/479 (viii 131.3), and it has been inferred from the action of Aristides (viii 95) that he too was a general in that year. They would normally have been elected in February/March 480 to take office as generals in the summer. The elections were of paramount importance with Xerxes about to invade; and there is no reason to suppose that the elections were deferred until a later date. Thus these two men had been recalled as ostracised persons from abroad at some time before February 480, and very probably in 481. Here Arist. *Ath Pol.* 22.8 is relevant; for the recall is put in the archonship of Hypsiechides, which is usually identified as 481/0. It cannot be 480/79, the year of Calliades (viii 51.1).

II. THE DECREE OF THEMISTOCLES AND ITS HISTORICAL SETTING

The inscription from Troezen which M. H. Jameson published in 1960 and many scholars have discussed was cut on Pentelic marble in the early part probably of the third century B.C. It was placed at Troezen, it seems, in connection with some statues which commemorated the evacuation of women and children from Athens to Troezen in the course of the Persian War (Paus. ii 31.7). The inscription itself recorded a decree by the Council and the People on the proposal of Themistocles; but it was not an exact copy of an original decree of that period, because the patronymic and the demotic were anachronistically included (and perhaps also because there is no indication of date).³² To this extent at least the inscription was derived not from an original inscription but from a literary text.³³ This is understandable, because decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles were cited presumably from literary texts by Attic orators in the latter part of the fourth century B.C. But that does not prevent the content being a correct copy of the content of the original.

When scholars tried to fit the content of the inscription to a historical situation, they found many difficulties. It could not be applied to the situation between the retreat from Artemisium and the battle of Salamis for two reasons: the decree arranges for the sending of ships to Artemisium, and the flight from Attica was the result of a 'proclamation' (viii 41.1) and not of a decree. The next step was to apply the content to the time between the expedition to Tempe and the expedition to Artemisium. For a decree in that period there is no ancient evidence at all (for Herodotus, as we have seen, described the decree mentioned in vii 144.3 as being carried in the debate on the responses from the Oracle of Delphi, which were much earlier, and Plut. *Them.*

³² This is not a decisive point. Those who feel no need of a date will point to the lack of a date in the earliest extant Attic decree (ML no. 14). However, our decree is different in having 'next day' attached to the order in line 20; thus anyone accusing the generals of failure to appoint a trierarch to each ship (beginning) 'next day' would need to know the date on which the decree was passed. It seems, then, likely that the date of the decree was recorded.

³³ While such literary versions were not verbatim but paraphrasing, they kept the sense of the original, as

we know from many later instances, where we have both the version and the original; see e.g. A. J. Podlecki, *The Life of Themistocles* (Montreal 1975) 162 ff. The original decrees of Miltiades and Themistocles were treasured as the most decisive decrees in the life of Athens, and literary versions are just what we should expect; Podlecki's arguments (160 f.) against the existence and transmission of the decree of Miltiades proceed not from the merit of the case but from the quality of the authors in which mentions of it have survived.

7.1 placed an attempt by Themistocles to achieve his purpose *before* the expedition to Tempe). However, Hignett and Burn, to cite two of many, had their own belief that some such decree had been passed between the expedition to Tempe and the expedition to Artemisium.³⁴ When the inscription from Troezen was published, they saw at once that this particular inscription could not be made to fit that particular time. Accordingly, Hignett wrote that 'the Troezen inscription cannot be a word-for-word transcript of the decree of 480'. And Burn remarked very justly that 'one would expect better of Themistocles' Athens than this last minute, deliberately fortuitous assembly of ships' companies which are to meet for the first time on the point of embarkation'. Their views were certainly correct. It would have been impossible to convert an army of at least some 20,000 soldiers into naval oarsmen in a matter of a few weeks while Xerxes' navy was within a few days' sail of Attica; for seamanship under oar required long training (Thuc. i 142.6–9). That date too has to be abandoned.

The occasion to which the content of the inscription should be applied is that described in vii 144.3. 'In the debate following the oracular response the Athenians decided to receive with their full forces on their warships the impending invasion of Greece by the barbarian, in obedience to the god, together with any Greeks who were willing.' The decision was taken on the proposal of Themistocles (143.3), in September 481 as we have seen. It is important for us to realise the significance of the phrase 'in obedience to the god'. The Athenians decided to obey Apollo's words as implicitly as the Spartans of Leonidas decided at Thermopylae to obey the words of the Lacedaemonians. The first part of Apollo's order was only too clear in both responses:

'Leave your homes and the high peaks of your wheel-like city'.

'Do not wait quietly for the cavalry and the great host of infantry's approach from the continent, but turn your backs on them and withdraw'.

The evacuation was to be made at once in advance of the enemy's approach from Asia. The people had to take with them any possessions and stock they wished to save; for Apollo had foretold the looting and the burning of the land, tower and temple alike.

This point was made most clearly by Thucydides when he recorded the Athenians' decision to leave the city, the removal of their property³⁵ and the embarking on their ships, which made them a naval people (i 18.2). Herodotus was less explicit. He stated at the start of his account (142.2) the view which prevailed in the Assembly: 'to prepare the ships and leave everything else'. In his summary at 144.3 he mentioned the decision to concentrate all their forces on resistance at sea (*cf.* 143.2) but not its corollary in the context, the abandonment of 'everything else'. He did so because he was describing the controversy over the meaning of 'the wooden wall' and 'holy Salamis' (142.1–143.3).³⁶

³⁴ Hignett (n. 5) 462 and Burn (n. 13) 366 f.; arguing mainly from a historical viewpoint, they have put the best case against the authenticity of the contents of the decree. Others who put the decision at that time are, e.g., J. Labarbe, *La loi navale de Thémistocle* (Paris 1957) 112 ff. and esp. 120; M. H. Jameson, 'A decree of Themistocles from Troezen', *Hesp.* xix (1960) 222; ML p. 52; M. Chambers, *AmHistR* lxxvii (1962) 306 ff.; J. and L. Robert, *REG* lxxv (1962) 155, with a useful summary of many articles; M. Treu, *Historia* xii (1963) 56.

³⁵ The removal of their property (*ἀνασκευασάμενοι*, i 18.2) to safety in the evacuation of 481 is to be contrasted with the loss of property (*τὰ οἰκεία διαφθείραντες* i 74.2) in September 480 when the fleet returned from Artemisium. Thucydides marked the different occasions: at i 18.2 *ἐπιόντων τῶν Μήδων*, as in Hdt. vii 144.3 *ἐπιόντα . . . τὸν βάρβαρον*, and at i 74 *τῶν ἄλλων ἤδη μεχρὶ ἡμῶν δουλευόντων*.

³⁶ Many have held that the evacuation began only at the time of the proclamation in viii 41.1 and was carried

out in panic in a few days (e.g. W. K. Pritchett, *AJA* lxvi [1962] 44 with reference to the Themistocles decree); a week at most was available then before the Persian fleet reached Phalerum. Herodotus added at viii 41.1 that the Athenians wished to comply with 'the oracular response', i.e. of vii 141.4 (this had enjoined evacuation in September 481); those who were still in Attica were presumably a minority of the non-combatant population. Polybius xxxviii 2.3 stressed the Athenians' ability to foresee the future which led them to evacuate Attica with their children and wives; he referred to the evacuation of 481 and not to the last-minute flight in September 480. So too Thuc. i 91.5, 'when it seemed to be better both to abandon the city and embark on the ships, the Athenians having made the decision without them (*viz.* the Spartans) dared to do so; and when they did plan together with them (e.g. in creating the Greek League), then again they proved second to none in policy'.

Evacuation then on Apollo's orders was to be immediate. No one knew at Athens in September 481 when and where the barbarian would strike. The campaigns of the three army groups in Asia Minor in the 490s and the strike by Datis and Artaphernes in 490 had been rapid; they did not lead men to expect the elephantine slowness of Xerxes, which we know by hindsight. The dispute over the meaning of 'the wooden wall' and 'holy Salamis' was resolved by the people adopting Themistocles' interpretation and deciding to equip the fleet and prepare for action at sea at once (142.2, 143.2). Immediate action was made the more necessary by the fact that Athens was at war with Aegina and that it was important, if possible, to defeat Aegina before the arrival of any Persian flotilla (144.2; cf. Thuc. i 14.3, Plut. *Them.* 4.1 and Polyae. i 30.6). There was in September 481 a sense of immediacy which we are apt to forget in our knowledge of what actually happened during the following twelve months.

Let us turn now to the decree.³⁷ It begins with the arrangements for evacuation.

[θεοί.]
 ἔδοξ[εν] τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμωι·
 Θεμισ[τοκλ]ῆς Νεοκλέους Φρεάρριος εἶπεν·
 τῆ[μ] μὲν πό[λιν παρ]ακατ[αθέ]σθαι τῆι Ἀθηναί τῆι Ἀθηνῶ-
 5 μ [μεδεο]ύ[σῃ] κ[αὶ τοῖς ἄλλ]οις θεοῖς ἅπασιν φυλάττει-
 ν κα[ὶ] ἀμ[ύνειν τὸμ βάρ]βαρ[ο]ν ὑπὲρ τῆς χώρας· Ἀθηναίου-
 [ς δ' ἀπ]α[ντας καὶ τοὺς ξένο]υς τοὺς οἰκοῦντας Ἀθήνησι
 [τὰ τέκ]ν[α καὶ τὰς γυναῖκ]ας εἰ[ς] Τροιζήνα καταθέσθαι
 τ[.....20.....] τοῦ ἀρχηγέτου τῆς χώρας· τ-
 10 [οὺς δὲ πρεσβύ]τας καὶ τὰ κτήματα εἰς Σαλαμίνα καταθ-
 ἐ[σθ]αι· τοὺς δὲ ταμίας καὶ τὰς ἱερέας ἐν τῆι ἀκροπόλε-
 [ι μένειν φυλάττοντας τὰ τῶ]ν θεῶν· τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους Ἀθη-
 [ναίους ἅπαντας καὶ τοὺς ξέ]νους τοὺς ἡβῶντας εἰσβαί-
 νειν εἰς τὰς ἐτοιμασθ]εἰ[σ]α[ς] διακοσίας ναῦς καὶ ἀμύ-
 15 νεσ[θαι] τ[ὸμ βάρβαρον ὑπὲρ τῆ]ς ἐλευθερίας τῆς τε ἑαυ-
 τῶν [.....18.....] μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ Κο-
 ριν[θίων καὶ . . . 9 . . .] καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶμ βουλομένω-
 [ν] κοινω[νῆσειν τοῦ κινδύνο]ν· καταστήσαι δὲ καὶ τριη-

To entrust the city to Athena, the mistress of Athens, and to all the other gods for safekeeping and for warding off the barbarian in defence of the land. To have all Athenians and all foreigners who are resident at Athens deposit their children and wives at Troezen . . . (lacuna) . . . to deposit the old and the property on Salamis; and to have the treasurers and the priestesses stay on the Acropolis to guard the property of the gods.

These arrangements fit the decision taken in September 481. It is probable that they were implemented to a great extent during the following weeks.³⁸ In any case Herodotus stated (admittedly in a speech of his own composition, but in words intended to inform us of a fact) that the Athenians lost two harvests, those of 480 and 479 (viii 142.3). The loss of the first harvest was due to the bulk of the population either not being in Attica at all, or, if in Attica, not being available for sowing the cereal crops which would ripen in May 480; this is understandable only

³⁷ Using the text of Meiggs–Lewis no. 23 but without all their restorations. Their commentary on earlier work is a model of sound judgement. This article does not include discussion of some details which have been used both to support and to refute the authenticity of the decree's contents, such as the named deities, the mention of polis and acropolis, the periphrases for metics and ostracised persons, and the phrases which are echoed in later writers. See the comments of Meiggs–Lewis and of Podlecki (n. 33) 147 ff. on their being

inconclusive.

³⁸ The order is immediate and unconditional; so R. Sealey, 'Again the siege of the Acropolis, 480 B.C.', *Cal. Stud. Class. Ant.* v (1972) 85: 'the language of the decree in providing for evacuation is an unqualified order, without any hint of allowing delay'. But the implementation was bound to take some months, when all able-bodied men were at sea on the triremes and the war with Aegina continued.

if there was at least a partial evacuation of Attica in winter to spring 481–0 and if the bulk of the male population was engaged in operational training.³⁹ We have an interesting analogy in the arrangements for the evacuation of London in 1939; they were made well in advance, and many people were evacuated almost a year before the bombs began to fall. Two details are worth noting. The receiving areas did not include Aegina, which was used in 480 (viii 41.1); for Athens and Aegina were still at war in September 481. The arrangements made in 481 for the priestesses to stay were altered at the time of the proclamation in September 480, when the non-appearance of the sacred snake was interpreted to mean that Athena herself had left the Acropolis (viii 41.3).

The next sentences record a decision to fight at sea against the barbarian.

All other Athenians and the foreigners of adult age are to embark on the prepared two hundred ships and to ward off the barbarian in defence of freedom for themselves . . . (lacuna) . . . with Lacedaemonians, Corinthians . . . (lacuna), and the others who are willing to share the danger.

The decision is that given briefly by Herodotus at vii 143.3: ‘The Athenians decided that the recommendation of Themistocles—to prepare themselves for battle at sea—was preferable to that of the oracle-interpreters, which was not to engage at sea’, and in consequence they passed a decree to put ‘all their forces on the ships’ (πανδημεί 144.3). At that time, in September 481, Athens had evidently learnt from Sparta, Corinth and one other state (in the lacuna) that they were committed to resistance.

The last words in this part τῶν ἄλλων τῶμ βουλομένω[ν] κοιω[νήσειν τοῦ κινδύνο]υ may have been read by Herodotus as he gives a paraphrase at vii 144.3, ἅμα Ἑλλήνων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι. The decision was taken before the loyalist Greeks formed themselves into a Greek League. If this decree had been passed in 480, as some have supposed, the wording would have been μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων as the loyalist Greeks styled themselves.

The missing name in the lacuna should be of nine letters. The restoration (for instance in ML 23) *Αἰγυνητῶν* will not do for September 481, when the war between Athens and Aegina was still being fought (it was terminated only after the formation of the Greek League). There are some possibilities among states which sent ships to fight at Artemisium in 480 (viii 1.2): the Chalcideans, the Eretrians and the Sicyonians.⁴⁰ We shall see later that a state in Euboea is probable.

The phrase in the decree ‘the prepared⁴¹ two hundred ships’ is more specific than that found in Herodotus. They had been ‘built beforehand’, Herodotus said, for the war against Aegina (vii 144.1; so too Thuc. i 14.3, Polyæn. i 30.6 and Plut. *Them.* 4.1) and they were available at the time of the decision, i.e. in September 481 (144.2 fin.). The laying down of the keels had been in the Attic year 483/2 according to Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7, so that anything between fourteen months and twenty-six months had been spent in building the ships. The decree and Herodotus agree on the number of the ships, which in the fourth-century tradition changed to a mere one hundred (e.g. Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7).

The orders for the implementation of these decisions follow in the decree in lines 18–40. As they do not help to decide the occasion of the decree, we shall consider them in the next section. Continuing with line 40, we translate as follows:

40 δῶνι τῶι Ἀσφα[λ]είωι· ν ν ἐπειδὴν δὲ πεπληρωμένοι ὦσιν αἱ νῆες, τα[ῖ]ς μὲν ἑκατὸν αὐτῶν βοηθεῖν ἐπὶ τὸ Ἀρτεμίσ- [ι]ον τὸ Εὐβοϊκόν, ταῖς δὲ ἑκατὸν αὐτῶν περὶ τὴν Σαλαμίνα καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἀττικὴν ναυλοχεῖν καὶ φυλάττειν τὴν χώραν· ὅπως δ’ ἂν καὶ ὁμοοῦντες ἅπαντες Ἀθηναῖοι

³⁹ If the crops had been sown and had then ripened in May 480, when the invading forces were known to be at Abydos, the armed forces waiting at the Isthmus or in or off Salamis would surely have harvested the crops, as the future might well hold a blockade of the troops and the refugees on Salamis. The troops did not move up to Artemisium until August. Burn (n. 13) 431 argues

otherwise. In autumn 480 Themistocles advised the Athenians to sow their land (viii 109.4).

⁴⁰ Sicyonians was suggested by A. M. Prestianni in her article in *Umanità e Storia: Scritti in onore di A. Attisani* (Messina 1971).

⁴¹ The preparedness would include all equipment, including oars.

- 45 ἀμύνωνται τὸν βάρβαρον, τοὺς μὲν μεθεστηκότας τὰ [δ]-
[έκα] ἔτη ἀπιέναι εἰς Σαλαμίνα καὶ μένειν αὐτοὺς ἐ[κε]-
[ὶ ἔως ἄν τι τῶι δῆμ]ωι δόξῃ περὶ αὐτῶν· τοὺς δὲ [ἀτίμου]-
[s-----] traces [------]

When the manning is completed, with one hundred ships they are to go to help to Euboean Artemisium, and with one hundred ships off Salamis and the rest of Attica they are to lie in wait and defend the land.

It seems clear from the division of the fleet that the Athenian people had two enemies in mind.

It was known in September 481 that Xerxes had set out from Susa that spring; that the advanced Persian forces in Thrace and Macedonia had just completed the canal through the neck of Mt Athos (vii 37.1, before Xerxes went into winter quarters at Sardis); and that the Aleuadae of Larissa were friendly with Persia (vii 6.2).⁴² The next advance for a Persian fleet would be to the Gulf of Pagasae or to Histiaea. The best station for any Greek fleet which wished to discourage or resist that advance was Artemisium in Euboea; for, once there, it threatened the approach to the gulf, blocked the advance down the Euboean Channel and lay on the flank of any advance on the seaward side of the long island of Euboea. The use of the verb *βοηθῆναι* (as at vi 103.1; 108.4 fin.; and 108.6 fin., when the Athenians went to defend Marathon) has the connotation of defence, and in this case it was to defend the Athenian colonists at Chalcis, who had fought at Marathon. They were always called *Χαλκιδῆς*.⁴³ I propose, then, to read in line 17 of the decree *Χαλκιδέων*. The despatch of a hundred ships to Artemisium in September 481 was sound both strategically and politically.

The stationing of a hundred ships, fully manned, off Salamis and off the rest of Attica to lie in wait and to guard the land makes no sense at all in relation to the Persian fleet which was to be held off by the fleet at Artemisium. It can have been intended only to deter or to act against attacks from a second enemy, namely the Aeginetan fleet, which was an immediate threat to Salamis and the coast of Attica (*cf.* v 81.3, 89.2).

Thus the dividing and the stationings of the fleet make sense in September 481. Then Athens was at war simultaneously with Persia and with Aegina. Indeed Polyaeus i.30 stated that the newly-built ships fought against the Aeginetans as well as against the Persians. In 480 they make no sense at all; for the need then was to send as many ships as were manned to Artemisium (Athens sent in the event two hundred ships in separate detachments of 147 and 53), and there was then no enemy to lie in wait for off Salamis or to deflect from the Attic coast.

In order that all Athenians in unanimity may repel the barbarian, those who are in their ten-year exile are to leave for Salamis and they are to wait there until such time as the people may decide about them. And the (? disfranchised). . . .

The phrase *τοὺς μὲν μεθεστηκότας τὰ [δέκα] ἔτη* means not those who have been recalled from the ten-year ostracism⁴⁴ but those who are in the state of serving such a period of absence. The

⁴² Their attitude since 492 was no doubt known at Athens (see n. 18).

⁴³ See my *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford 1972) 261 n. 3.

⁴⁴ As Meiggs–Lewis suggest in saying that those ostracised were ‘perhaps already back in Athens’. The order was to leave wherever they happened to be and go to Salamis, where the People (restored in the lacuna) or their representatives were to decide about them; Salamis was thus to be the seat of government of the evacuated state, as in 479 (ix 5.1). The ostracised persons, being still citizens, were under the orders of the People (*cf.* Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.8). Considerable confusion has been introduced into this part of the decree by two propositions, that *τοὺς μὲν μεθεστηκότας τὰ [δέκα]*

ἔτη means ‘those who have been exiled for ten years’, and that *ἀπιέναι εἰς Σαλαμίνα* means ‘to leave Athens and go to Salamis’ (for example, in S. M. Burstein, ‘The Recall of the Ostracised and the Themistocles Decree’, *Cal. Stud. Class. Ant.* iv [1971] 94, 103). In fact none of the ostracised persons from Hipparchus onwards had been in exile ‘the ten years’. The idea that these persons were sitting in Athens is most improbable; indeed even advocates of this interpretation balk at having Hipparchus there (Burstein 109). There is nothing unusual about *ἀπιέναι* which means to go away from where you are to another place, as often, e.g. in Hdt. i 63.2 fin., vi 97.2. It may be translated ‘to return’ when you go back to where you had been at an earlier stage (as in the passages from Herodotus which I have cited and as in

decision is to recall such persons (Andoc. i 107 was probably paraphrasing this phrase in his words 'to recall those in exile') and to let the people decide what to do with them, when they have presented themselves at Salamis. The recall of the 'ostracised' is dated by Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.8 to the archonship of Hypsichides, which is usually identified as 481/o.⁴⁵ The return, then, of Xanthippus and Aristides in or soon after September 481 would have given them time to make their mark in public life at Athens before the elections of the generals in Feb./March 480 for the ensuing archon-year. On the other hand at any time between the expedition to Tempe and that to Artemisium in 480 there were ten already elected generals about to take office or in office, and it is most improbable that two of them were demoted by the People in order to make way for men returning then from exile.

Thus on all counts the date appropriate to the decree of Themistocles at Troezen is September 481, since it fits the available evidence. On almost all counts a time between the expedition to Tempe and the expedition to Artemisium is ruled out, as Hignett and Burn and others have seen.

III. THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE DECREE AT TROEZEN PRESERVES THE CONTENT OF AN ORIGINAL DECREE OF THE ATHENIAN STATE IN SEPTEMBER 481

Even if we are correct in maintaining that the decree of Themistocles at Troezen referred to the situation in September 481 of which Herodotus happens to have given us a brief description, it does not follow that the decree was based on an original record of the decree of 481. A scholarly forger who had read Herodotus with understanding, picked up a point or two from any oral or written tradition of his own time (probably the late fourth century) and exercised a lively imagination, might have concocted a fair copy of a plausible decree for lines 1–18 and lines 40–7 of our present decree. Had he, for instance realised that Athens and Aegina were still at war, he could have thought up the division of the fleet and the stationings of its parts which are in our decree. There are after all almost no limits to scholarly ingenuity. But how that fair copy came to impose itself upon the writers of Athenian history (the Attidographers) and upon an intelligent public is a question to which I have no answer. One can always fall back on the saying of Herodotus: *εἴη δ' ἄν πᾶν*, 'anything is possible'.

Lines 18–40 of the decree are, however, another matter. There are no references in Herodotus or elsewhere to the way in which a fleet of 200 ships was to be manned by its personnel. A forger would have to spin the subject and the details out of his own head. *Cui bono?* The manning of a fleet in the remote past was of interest only to a few very specialised scholars, and even they, if we may judge from the struggles of their twentieth-century successors,⁴⁶ would have found it difficult to make sense of the forger's effort, if what we have in lines 18–40 is a forger's effort.

The first requisite for an understanding of lines 18–40 is to envisage the problem. The 200 ships needed 40,000 personnel, since a trireme in 480 had a complement in action of 200 men (viii 17). As they were being manned to fight against highly trained ships with crews of 200 men, Aeginetans in the Saronic Gulf and Phoenicians off Artemisium, they could not be manned, say with crews of 150 men. One does not compete with six men against eight men in a boat race! If Athens could raise only 30,000 men she would man 150 triremes for action and not underman

Tod, *GHI* ii no. 142.50), but not in our decree because Hipparchus and the others had departed from Attica, we may be sure, and not from Salamis. There is no mention of 'amnesty' in the sources, for there was nothing to forgive an ostracised person. If Hipparchus had intrigued with Persia during his period of ostracism, his best course was to disobey the order and stay away.

⁴⁵ So J. E. Sandys in his edition of Arist. *Ath. Pol.*

22.8 and T. J. Cadoux, *JHS* lxxviii (1948) 118 f. At Hdt. viii 79. 1 the word *ἐξωστρακισμένος* means for me that Aristides had been banished by ostracism and not that he was so banished at that moment.

⁴⁶ The difficulties are well brought out by M. H. Jameson, *Historia* xii (1963) 385 ff; they are only in part due to the lacunae in the text. The arrangements cannot have interested the Troezenians.

200. In a crew of 200 if we allow 20 for officers and marines, including four archers, the total number of trained oarsmen was 180, and the total needed for 200 ships was 36,000. Athens had already in 490/89 a pool of trained oarsmen numbering 12,500, as she sent 70 ships against Paros (vi 132);⁴⁷ and during the war against Aegina and in the expectation of new ships coming off stocks in 481 Athens may have trained some additional oarsmen to raise the total to, say, 16,000. Thus they still needed 20,000 more men in order to row 200 ships in battle, that is at the start of an action. The bulk of these 20,000 had to be taken from the existing army, which was made up of ten tribal divisions (*taxeis*), each with its own *esprit de corps*.⁴⁸ Of the 20,000 men a division of 100 had to be allocated to each of the 200 ships. Once a ship was engaged in action there was a considerable chance that a boarding-battle would ensue. In that case a proportion of the oarsmen would become fighters. It would be sensible to designate the ex-army men for this fighting, and to let the previously trained oarsmen hold the ship under oar.

In order to reach the grand total of 40,000 men for the fleet, it was necessary to go beyond the ranks of the citizens who were numbered approximately at 30,000 by Herodotus (v 97.2). Thus the state had to conscript non-citizens within its confines. Indeed slaves had fought at Marathon (Paus. i 32.3).⁴⁹ This made it all the more important to give to the citizens who were being transferred from the army a role and perhaps a title in the navy which would satisfy their *amour propre* on becoming seamen. The term was probably *ναῦται*, 'seamen', as opposed to *ἐρέται*, 'oarsmen'; for we learn from [Dem.] l 29–30 that the categories on a trireme in the fourth century were *ναῦται* (citizens, unlike most of the oarsmen at that time), *ἐπιβάται* (marines) and *ὑπηρεσία* (oarsmen collectively). It appears that *ὑπηρεσία* in the decree has this meaning, as we shall see later.

Let us translate the decree from line 18 onwards, adding some comments.

- [ν] κοινω[νήσειν τοῦ κινδύνο]ν καταστήσαι δὲ καὶ τριη-
 [ρ]ά[ρχους διακοσίους ἕνα ἐπὶ] τὴν ναῦν ἐκάστην τοὺς [σ]-
 20 τρατη[γ]οῦ[σ] ἀρχομένους τ[ῆ]ι αὔριον ἡμέραι ἐκ τῶν κ[εκ]-
 τημέν[ω]ν γ[ῆ]ν τ[ε] καὶ [οἰκί]αν Ἀθ[ῆ]νησι καὶ οἷς ἄμ παιδ[ε]ς
 ὧσι γνή[σιοι μὴ πρεσβυτέρο]υς πεντήκοντα ἐτῶν κα[ὶ] ἐ-
 πικληρῶσαι αὐτ[οῖς] τ[ὰς] ναῦς· ν ν καταλέξει δὲ καὶ ἐπ[ι]-
 25 βάτας [δ]έκα [ἐφ' ἐκάστη]ν ναῦν ἐκ τῶν ὑπὲρ εἴκοσιν ἔτη [γ]-
 εγονότ[ω]ν μέχρι τριάκοντα ἐτῶν καὶ τοξότας τέτταρ-
 ας· διακληρῶσαι δὲ καὶ τ[ὰς] ὑπηρεσίας ἐπὶ τ[ὰς] ναῦς ὄτ-
 αμπερ κ[αὶ] τοὺς τριηρά[ρχ]ους ἐπικληρῶσιν· ἀναγράψα-
 ι δὲ καὶ τοὺς . . . 6 . . . κατὰ] ναῦν τοὺς στρατηγούς εἰς λ-
 30 ευκώ[ματα, τοὺς μὲν Ἀ]θηναίους ἐκ τῶν ληξιαρχικῶν γρ-
 αμματεῖ[ων, τοὺς] δὲ ξ[έν]ους ἐκ τῶν ἀπογεγραμμένων πα-
 [ρ]ά τῶι [πολε]μ[άρχ]ω[ι]· ἀναγράφειν δὲ νέμοντας κατὰ τάξ-
 35 εἰς [εἰς] διακοσίας ἄ[ν] ἐκατὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἐπιγράψα-
 ι τ[ῆ]ι . . . 4 . . . ἐκάστη τῆς τριήρους τὸ ὄνομα καὶ τοῦ τρι-
 ηράρχου καὶ τῆς ὑπηρε[σί]ας ὅπως ἂν εἰδῶσιν εἰς ὁποί-
 40 αν τριήρη ἐ[μ]βήσεται ἢ τ[ά]ξις ἐ[κ]άστη· ἐπειδὴν δὲ νεμη-
 θῶσιν ἅπα[σ]αι αἱ τάξεις καὶ ἐπικληρωθῶσι ταῖς τριή-
 ρεσι, πληροῦν ἅ[π]άσας τ[ὰς] διακοσίας ναῦς τῆμ βουλήν
 καὶ τ[ο]ῦ στρατηγού[σ] θύ[σαν]τας ἀρεστήριον τῶι Διὶ τῶι
 Παγκρατεῖ καὶ τῆι Ἀθηνᾶι καὶ τῆι Νίκηι καὶ τῶι Ποσει-
 40 δῶνι τῶι Ἀσφα[λ]είωι· ν ν ἐπειδὴν δὲ πεπληρωμένοι ὧσιν

⁴⁷ They had earlier manned seventy ships, in 490 (vi 89).

⁴⁸ Both as hoplites and as light-armed troops, including archers.

⁴⁹ Later too in 479 the phrase 'those of the households useless for war' (viii 142.4) implies that fit household-slaves were on war service. See *Studies* (n. 43) 197 n. 2 for 'the grave of Plataeans and slaves'.

Beginning tomorrow,⁵⁰ the generals are to appoint 200 trierarchs, one to a ship, from men not over fifty years of age who possess land and house at Athens and have legitimate sons; and the Generals are to allocate the ships to them by lot.

These trierarchs were ship-commanders and not merely, as often in the fourth century, equippers of ships. The term was so used by Herodotus of the Samian navy and the Athenian navy at the time of the Persian Wars (vi 14.2, viii 93.2).⁵¹

From men aged between twenty and thirty they are to call up ten marines to a ship and four archers—totals of 2,000 marines and 800 archers. The small number of marines and archers to each ship was intended to leave the ship light for manoeuvring and ramming under oar. This restriction in the number of non-oarsmen and the partial decking of the new ships (Thuc. i 14.3) were special features of the new fleet designed by Themistocles (Plut. *Cimon* 12.2)⁵² in contrast to the contemporary Ionian and Phoenician ships which were built and manned primarily for boarding tactics (vi 15.1, vii 184.2) or for carrying raiding parties. Athens had a group of trained citizen-archers, perhaps of about the requisite total at this time,⁵³ but not sufficiently numerous for Miltiades to have taken them to Marathon, where the Persian archers would have outshot them. At the battle of Salamis the number of marines to a ship was increased to fourteen (no doubt in the light of experience in battle) but the number of archers to a ship stayed the same (Plut. *Them.* 14.2).

They are to distribute the oarsmen-groups by lot to the ships at such time as they are allocating the trierarchs by lot.

It is clear that the oarsmen-groups (*ὑπηρέσιαι*) were already in existence, as they are mentioned now without any further definition of who they were. They were evidently groups of 80 trained oarsmen available for the 'prepared' two hundred ships from the pool of some 16,000 trained oarsmen of the navy.⁵⁴

The Generals are to publish on notice-boards ship by ship the names of the seamen (reading not *ἄλλους* but *ναύτας* in the lacuna),⁵⁵ both the Athenians from the deme-registers and the foreigners from the lists with the Polemarch. In publishing them they are to allocate them in divisions of one hundred in number up to two hundred (divisions) and to write up on each trireme's noticeboard⁵⁶ both the name of the trierarch and the name of the oarsmen-group, so that they may know on which

⁵⁰ This probably shows that the original of our copy—at whatever remove—gave the date; see n. 32.

⁵¹ Also in Plut. *Them.* 15.2.

⁵² Themistocles had arranged the design of the 200 ships as was best for 'speed off the mark and for bringing them round' (*πρὸς μὲν τάχος ἀπ' ἀρχῆς καὶ περιαγωγῆν*) under oar, both being desirable in the manoeuvre known as the *diekplous*. The source may be Damastes, for whom see n. 69 below. Burn (n. 13) 367, distrusts this evidence because Herodotus viii 60a described the ships as 'heavier'; it was this weight which made them lower in the water (Plut. *Them.* 14.2) and easier to control under oar in a swell or choppy sea than the high Phoenician ships, but slower under sail (viii 10.1).

⁵³ Their service against the Persians was commemorated by Simonides (*Anth. Pal.* vi 2); in the heyday of the Athenian empire they numbered 1,600 (Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 24.3; see J. E. Sandys *ad loc.* for citizen as opposed to Scythian archers).

⁵⁴ Whatever else a ship needs, an oarsmen-group is essential. Since trierarchs, marines, archers and—if the restoration is accepted—'seamen' are mentioned, the only term available for the oarsmen-group is *ὑπηρέσιαι*. The word meant 'an organised team of oarsmen', as

surely as *ὑπηρέτης* 'originally meant a member of it' according to L. D. J. Richardson, *CQ* xxxvii (1943) 61. His view that the term 'has the essential note of subservience' is improbable, since the *ὑπασπισταί* were the *corps d'élite* of the Macedonian infantry. When the large navy had become fully established the word was sometimes used in a narrow, specialised sense; see B. Jordan, *Cal. Stud. Class. Ant.* ii (1969) 183 ff. and esp. 201. Proposals to interpret *τὰς ὑπερησίας* in line 26 as a resumption of 'marines and archers' instead of using *αὐτούς*, and to suppose that each group of them on each ship had its own collective name at line 34 are unconvincing (see B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period*, *Calif. Class. Stud.* xiii [1975] 247). The proposal to make them 'petty officers' instead of 'marines and archers' runs into the second objection.

⁵⁵ As restored in the lacuna by Woodhead, Stroud and Jordan.

⁵⁶ Restoring *πτύχι* in the lacuna with Jordan (n. 54) 239. If one restores *τάξει* with ML, the expression is pleonastic as it recurs two lines lower and there is no object for *ἐπιγράφειν*. However, the choice is not material to the sense, which is that it was necessary to record the trireme to which each division had to go to embark.

trireme each division will embark. Whenever all the divisions are distributed and allocated to the triremes by lot, all two hundred ships are to be manned by the Council and the Generals, after the latter have made a propitiatory sacrifice to Zeus Almighty, Athena, Victory and Poseidon the Saver (*asphaleios*).

It is clear that each oarsmen-group had a name, even as an oarsmen-group may have today (the Athenians too had boat races), and it was this name which was put up on a ship's notice-board. The system described in the decree is self-explanatory. When distributing the groups of *ναῦται*, the Generals would send division A to the trireme of Captain 'Agathos' and of oarsmen-group 'Chrysoi' or whatever. The word 'division' (*taxis*) was used because the army itself was divided into ten divisions (*taxeis*).⁵⁷ Now one twentieth of each of these divisions formed a ship's division of *nautai*, the men of each division keeping their identity as *nautai* of the Erechtheid tribe, for instance.

In the regulations of the decree we find the cast of mind which had inspired the reforms of Cleisthenes.⁵⁸ The delight in decimal enumeration which is seen in the Cleisthenic Council of 500, formed of 10 divisions of 50 each with its own tribal affiliations and each sitting for a tenth of the year as a committee, is found here in the 200 divisions of 100 each for 20,000 men of the army to man 200 ships, these men being divided in accordance with the army system into 200 divisions, each with its own tribal affiliation. A typical feature of the Cleisthenic system was the retention of a traditional term in a new setting, e.g. *trittys*; and so here the army term *taxis* was used in the manning of the navy. Again the definition by age and property which required the Councillors to be both of zeugite census or above and over thirty years of age is found here in the definition of those eligible to be trierarchs.⁵⁹ Equally emphatic in both cases is the importance of the lot, itself a sign of trust in the deities. Again the same attempt to win by sacrifice the approval of the deities. As Herodotus said of the decree at vii 144.3 'they obeyed the god', meaning Apollo. The gods to whom the sacrifices were made would watch over the two flotillas of the new fleet when they put to sea with the total manpower of the city on an autumn day in 481.⁶⁰

This part of the decree shows the care and the insight into human nature with which the navy was to be expanded into almost thrice its previous size, the army was to be totally merged into the navy without losing the basis of its *esprit de corps* and the new fleet was to be deployed for training at sea and for action against two enemies. The training that followed during that winter and in the early summer was such that the first prize was awarded to the Athenian fleet in the action which did develop off Artemisium in September 480, not because it was the largest of the Greek contingents but because it showed the finest seamanship and the best fighting quality. Themistocles used that period of training as successfully as Philip of Macedon was to use the winter of 359–8 for training a new army. By these methods as well as by the reinstatement of minority persons and groups, Themistocles ensured that 'all Athenians in singleness of purpose should defend themselves against the barbarian' (lines 44–5), thereby achieving that *ὁμόνοια* which was the hallmark of the Cleisthenic state.⁶¹

Thus lines 18–40 of the decree fit the dimensions of the problem which faced the planners in September 481, a problem which never arose again since the great fleet came to stay; and they accord in a most remarkable way with the spirit and method of the Cleisthenic period. It seems

⁵⁷ These tribal divisions had existed at least since 501/500, when Cleisthenes made his army reforms; they are discussed in *Studies* (n. 43) 346 ff.

⁵⁸ Meiggs–Lewis 51 do not follow Burn (n. 13) 367 f.; he found it 'redolent of the fourth century' but partly by assuming Themistocles to have put large numbers of marines on 'the young, mass-produced navy', despite the ancient evidence.

⁵⁹ The insistence on possessing a (family) estate of land (in Attica) and a house at Athens and on having legitimate sons to continue the family went along with

the retention of the *gene* by Cleisthenes (*Arist. Ath. Pol.* 21.6). Such persons were regarded as particularly trustworthy; but if one should desert or fail (and at Lade forty-nine out of sixty trierarchs in the Samian squadron had failed to engage and sailed away), the state could fine his family.

⁶⁰ An occasion of greater significance than the sailing of the Athenian fleet to Sicily, which Thucydides described so brilliantly (vi 32).

⁶¹ *Plut. Per.* 3.1.

highly improbable that this is the work of a late-fourth-century forger. We can see from the 'constitution of Draco' in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 4 the inability of a forger to understand the conditions of an earlier period and to envisage the spirit of the past. Moreover, we should expect to find in a forgery matters of interest to a late-fourth-century writer, such as the methods of raising finance or compelling reluctant trierarchs (in the fourth-century sense) to shoulder the financial burden, and not the once-and-for-all methods of manning a navy with army personnel. In short, there is very good reason to suppose that this part of the decree is derived ultimately from and has preserved the sense of an original decree of September 481. If so, it carries the rest of the decree with it.

APPENDIX ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE LATER TRADITION

It is beyond doubt that the most dependable account of the Persian Wars is that of Herodotus.⁶² If the chronology of events in 480–1 is such as we have described, we may expect to find some traces of it in accounts which are independent of Herodotus. That such accounts existed is clear from the fragments, for instance, of Damastes, a younger contemporary of Herodotus (*FGrH* 5 T 1 and 2), who mentioned an advance of the Greeks beyond Tempe to Heracleum in Macedonia and the name of the leading mediser in Thessaly 'Aleuas' (F 4), and was interested in the development of warship-construction (F 6).⁶³ Thus Damastes wrote with more detail and probably at greater length on the Persian Wars than Herodotus did. What differences there were between them we do not know; but Damastes was still so close to the time of the Wars that he could not depart widely from the chronological sequence of the events. The work of Damastes survived into the period of the Roman Empire and was known to late writers such as Strabo, Plutarch, Pliny and probably Pausanias. His influence is probably to be seen in some parts of Plutarch, *Themistocles*, and of Cornelius Nepos, *Themistocles*.

The clearest chronological sequence is found in Nepos, *Them.* 2–3, where 'the Corcyraean war' is a careless error by Nepos for the Aeginetan war. In the course of that war Themistocles was given a special command as 'praetor', which enabled him to make Athens more formidable not only for that war but also for the future by persuading the people to use the profit from the mines for building a fleet of one hundred ships. The ships were built quickly. With them Themistocles broke the power of Aegina and put down piracy, thereby enriching Athens and making her people most skilled in naval warfare. After giving the numbers of Xerxes' expeditionary force against Europe as 1,200 warships, 2,000 merchant ships, 700,000 infantry and 400,000 cavalry, Nepos continues with the news coming through⁶⁴ to Greece that Xerxes was on the way and aimed particularly at Athens. It was when this news had arrived that the Athenians consulted the Oracle of Delphi and received the response to fortify themselves with 'the wooden wall'. Themistocles thereupon gave his interpretation of its meaning and persuaded the Athenians that the advice of Apollo was to place themselves and their possessions on the ships. Accordingly they added as many triremes as before (i.e. another hundred)⁶⁵ and carried all moveable possessions partly to Salamis and partly to Troezen. They entrusted the acropolis and the care of the sacred property to the priests and a few elders,⁶⁶ and they abandoned the rest of

⁶² See Hignett (n. 5) 4 ff. and esp. 39, and my *Studies* (n. 43) 227 ff.

⁶³ The advance to the 'Olympic pass' (see n. 5) was probably historical. The name Aleuas occurred in Hdt. vii 130.3 and ix 58.1–2 as father of the medists who accompanied Xerxes (the words 'the sons of Aleuas' there should not be confused with the word 'Aleuadai' at vii 6.2 and 172.1; so too 'the sons of Heracles' were not the same as the Heracleidai); Paus. vii 10.2 probably got from Damastes the name Aleuas, which should be read there for the corrupt *Ἀλευάδου*. Damastes may

well be the source of valuable naval information in Plut. *Them.* 14.1–2 and *Cim.* 12.2; see N. Robertson (n. 18) 101 f. This Aleuas was the Aleuas, son of Simus, in Euphorion ap. schol. Theoc. xvi 34, and he was active longer than Beloch supposed (*GG* i 2.206; his son Thorax could commission Pind. *Pyth.* 10 without being himself the leading Aleuad).

⁶⁴ *Fama esset perlata*; compare Justin ii 10.14 *perferendas*, used of Demaratus' message.

⁶⁵ Presumably old ships which were in the sheds.

⁶⁶ Perhaps Nepos was translating *tamiai*, treasurers.

the town. Most states were displeased with Themistocles' plan and preferred a decisive battle on land. So a select force was sent with Leonidas to hold Thermopylae.

The sequence here may be summarised as follows. The special command of Themistocles and his use of the money from the mines (both in 483/2, if we accept Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 22.7); the construction of the fleet (presumably in 482/1); the defeat of Aegina with the hundred new ships; the coming of the news to Greece (not Athens), presumably from Demaratus, as in Herodotus, in summer 481; the consultation of Delphi in view of the news, the decision to move onto the ships and the evacuation of the town—all in autumn 481. The states which were displeased by Themistocles' strategy were no doubt the Peloponnesian states mainly (as subsequently in the narrative of Herodotus), and their displeasure was voiced at a meeting of the Council of the Greek League (which first appears here in the narrative of Nepos) after the decision taken by Athens. While the narrative is dependent not on Herodotus but on another writer (perhaps Damastes), the sequence and the approximate dates of the events common to Nepos and Herodotus are the same: the money for and the construction of the new ships, the coming of news, the consultation of Delphi, the decision to move onto the ships, and the meeting of the Greek League.

Nepos moved next to the expedition to Thermopylae. On the other hand, Plutarch mentioned the expedition to Tempe at the corresponding point in his narrative, at *Them.* 7.1. Having written of a special command⁶⁷ to which Themistocles had been elected at Athens (6.1), Plutarch continues:

Immediately on taking up the command Themistocles began the attempt to embark the citizens on the triremes, and he began to persuade the Athenians to abandon their city and meet the enemy at sea as far away from Athens as possible in Greece.⁶⁸ Since many were opposing this, he led out a large army to Tempe with the Lacedaemonians, as the Lacedaemonians intended to undergo the dangers of war in defence of Thessaly, which was not yet at that time thought to be medising.⁶⁹ When they returned from there without having achieved anything, and when, the Thessalians having joined the Great King, the region as far as Boeotia medised, the Athenians began already to pay more attention to Themistocles and his naval policy.

Thermopylae and Artemisium follow, but the commitment to the naval policy is kept until the eve of Salamis. Then, at 10.2, 'he tried again with the oracular response to win the people, saying that the only meaning of the wooden wall was the ships'. Plutarch had mentioned earlier, at 4.1–2, the use of the revenue from the mines for building a hundred ships for the war against Aegina. Here he relates the special command of Themistocles to his first attempt, as he represents it to carry the naval policy and the evacuation of Athens. Next, like Nepos, he mentions the opposition but he leaves it unexplained. In this sequence it seems probable that Plutarch was drawing on the same source as Nepos. But Plutarch reserves the description of the oracular response, the success of Themistocles in carrying his naval policy and the evacuation until the most dramatic moment, just before the battle of Salamis.⁷⁰

In so doing Plutarch followed the trend which is noticeable in fourth-century writers. If one was prepared to overlook the fact that Athens must have accepted the naval policy much earlier

⁶⁷ Plutarch is confused and confusing about this command, which he mentioned first in his story of Themistocles bribing Epicyles (6.1) and then at 7.3 as if it bore some relation to Eurybiades. Perhaps Themistocles was elected to a special overall command of Athenian forces for 482/1 or for 481 before the formation of the Greek League. Once that League had arranged for its own forces, Themistocles was elected to take command of Athenians serving in the Greek League's forces: see *Studies* (n. 43) 380 f. It is this command which Plutarch failed to understand at 7.3.

⁶⁸ Not 'as far away from Greece as possible', because a fleet of triremes had to operate from a friendly coast.

⁶⁹ Herodotus' account is entirely different in that he gives other reasons for the return of the Greek forces (vii 173.3–4) and mentions an earlier medisation of Thessaly (vii 132.1, 172.1). Damastes F 4 is compatible with Plutarch's story, because Damastes had Alexander 'informing' the Greeks of the treachery of Aleuas and Thessalians, i.e. of something they did not already know.

⁷⁰ Justin goes one better in attributing the consultation of the Oracle, the decision and the evacuation all to the last days before the battle (ii 12.13–16); so too Ael. Arist. i 154.

in order to man two hundred ships and send them all into action at Artemisium, it made a more sensational story to place the decision and the decree just before the famous battle in the straits of Salamis. So with Attica open to the enemy Themistocles deploys the oracles, carries his decree, starts the evacuation, raises money by personally ransacking the luggage of the embarking Athenians (this from Cleidemus) amid scenes of general distress and with Xanthippus' dog swimming alongside his master's ship to Salamis and expiring on the shore at a place thereafter called Cynossema; and next, to show Themistocles' magnanimity, he reports Themistocles' recall of the ostracised (forgetting that Xanthippus as one of them could not have been on the way to Salamis). All this in Plut. *Them.* 10–11.1,⁷¹ together with a mention of the raising of money by the Areopagus Council as told in Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 23.1 (a constant problem in fourth-century Athens). The story of Xanthippus' dog is retold, but with more dogs than one, by Aelian *NA* xii 35 who had it from Aristotle (*fr.* 399 R) and Philochorus (*FGrH* 328 F 116).⁷² The recall of those who were serving their term of ostracism was downdated to the eve of the battle in Plutarch *Them.* 11.1; Plut. *Arist.* 8.1;⁷³ and Nepos, *Arist.* 1.5.

Thus we can see what happened to the Decree of Themistocles over two centuries. Herodotus placed it where it belonged, just after Athens had consulted the Oracle of Delphi in late summer 481; and the source used by Nepos (perhaps Damastes) did likewise. Other authors moved the decree and its concomitants down to the eve of Salamis, the time when Herodotus mentioned the *saue qui peut* proclamation (viii 41.1).⁷⁴ This move occurred already in the fourth century. Any forger in that century would have followed suit in order to impose his version on his contemporaries. The Decree of Themistocles which has been found at Troezen was so worded that it could not be placed on the eve of Salamis. We conclude, therefore, that this Decree is a copy made in the third century not of a fourth-century forgery⁷⁵ but of a literary version of the original decree of September 481.

N. G. L. HAMMOND

The University of Auckland

⁷¹ Plutarch 10.2–3 combines an echo of the Decree of Themistocles with the proclamation 'each to save his household as best he can' in Hdt. viii 41.1.

⁷² Aelian's chronology is in vague terms which could fit any time in 481–0, but the story evidently belonged with that told by Plutarch which many have attributed to Cleidemus.

⁷³ Although Plutarch gave the correct year of the recall in saying 'in the third year' after the ostracism of 483/2 (the three years being inclusively 483/2, 482/1 and 481/0), his context for the recall 'when Xerxes was marching through Thessaly and Boeotia against Attica' belongs to 480/79, being in late September 480; it is a

good example of sensational dating rather than vague dating (Podlecki [n. 33] 15).

⁷⁴ The only mention of the battle of Artemisium in relation to the decree in an ancient source is a worthless one in one of the scholia to Dem. xix 303 which tries to get the best of both late occasions by remarking *ὅτε τὰ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι καὶ ἐπ' Ἀρτεμισίῳ*.

⁷⁵ As D. M. Lewis remarked, *CQ* xi (1961) 66, 'I see no reason to suspect forgery. There are too many traces of official and archaic language.' See also B. D. Meritt in *Lectures in Memory of L. T. Semple, 1961–65*, ed. D. W. Bradeen, 121 ff., esp. 128.